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INTRODUCTION

The potential for Hong Kong, now formally known as the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China
(PRC), to serve as a model for helping solve problems in other parts of the
world was first suggested by the Beijing leadership while talks between
Great Britain and the PRC about Hong Kong's post-1997 future were still
taking place. As early as June 22-23, 1984, PRC paramount leader Deng
Xiaoping remarked to a Hong Kong industrial and commercial delegation
L.L.M. Harvard Law School; J.S.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School 2001.
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that the "successful settlement of Hong Kong's status might provide useful
elements for the solution of international questions." 1 On July 31, 1984, he
told British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe that:
[T]he 'one country, two systems' formula will work. This will produce a
favorable reaction internationally and will serve as an example for other
nations in settling disputes history has bequeathed to them. When we
developed the concept of 'one country, two systems', we also considered
what methods could be used to resolve international disputes. There are
so many issues all over the globe that are tangled in knots and very
difficult to solve. It is possible, I think, that some of them might be
disentangled by this method.2
After the negotiations between the PRC and Britain led to the
conclusion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in December 1984, 3 there
were considerable international echoes of the Chinese advocacy. For
example, on April 9-12, 1986, the American Society of International Law
held a panel session discussing "the Hon Kong Accord as a Model for
Dealing with Other Disputed Territories.' As one of the panelists, Hurst
Hannum, pointed out during the discussion and subsequently, Hong Kong's
"extremely broad" external relations powers are "where one sees the extent
of the autonomy that has been granted" to it,5 6and such autonomy is "the
most distinctive feature" of the Joint Declaration.
This Article discusses the HKSARs external autonomy and, as
indicated by the title, treats it as a model of regional external autonomy. As
the HKSAR has celebrated its second anniversary, it is now possible to
consider not only what is stated in the Joint Declaration, and in Hong Kong's

1 DENG XIAOPING, ON THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 9 (Bureau for the Compilation and
Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin Under the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China (trans., Foreign Language Press 1993).
2

Id. at 14.

See Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, P.R.C.-U.K., reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1366 (1984) (an
international agreement, between Great Britain and the PRC, consisting of three annexes
and two brief memoranda, which was the result of two years and 23 formal sessions of
arduous negotiations and which entered into force on May 27, 1985), also available at
<http://www.info.gov.hk/trans/jd/jd2.htm> (visited Feb. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Joint
Declaration].
4 Kevin M. Harris (reporter), The Hong Kong Accord as a Model for Dealing
with
Other Disputed Territories,80 AM. SOC'Y OFINT'LL. 348 (1986).
5 Id. at 365-66 (Remarks of Hurst Hannum).
3

6

HURST

HANNUM,

AUTONOMY,

SOVEREIGNTY,
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Basic Law,7 but also what has actually happened in the first two years of the
HKSAR's existence. This Article is, however, not an attempt to discuss any
immediate applicability of the I-KSAR model to other parts of the world, but
rather to consider major characteristics of Hong Kong's external autonomy
and the respective roles of the HKSAR, China, and the international
community in shaping such external autonomy into the next century. It will
serve, hopefully, as a useful step on the road to the HKSAR's being
considered seriously as a workable model of external autonomy that might be
applied elsewhere in the future.
Part I of the Article examines the HKSAR's unprecedented external
autonomy and Hong Kong's own role in forming and sustaining its external
relations. Part II then discusses the Chinese aspect of the HKSAR's external
relations and the PRC's role in determining Hong Kong's external autonomy.
Finally, Part III considers the role of the international community in
recognizing and supporting Hong Kong's external autonomy and its
international legal status.

I. HONG KONG AND ITS EXTERNAL AUTONOMY
The first qualification for the HKSAR's external autonomy to be
characterized as a model of regional external autonomy is the extensiveness
of the external relations powers enjoyed by the HKSAR. The HKSAR
arguably enjoys in real terms more far-reaching external autonomy than any
other autonomous region in the world. Hong Kong's outstanding external
autonomy gradually evolved from, and is firmly based on, its Britishinfluenced international character. The future of the HKSAR's external
autonomy will depend not only on continued support from China and the
international community but also on Hong Kong's own performance in
maintaining its international character, 8 especially its position in the world
economy.
A.

UnprecedentedRegional ExternalRelations Powers

According to Article 62 of the Basic Law, the HKSAR government
shall exercise the power to "conduct external affairs as authorized by the
7 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China (1990), reprinted in 29 LL.M. 1511 (1990), also available at
<httpJ/vww.info.gov.hklbasicjlaw/english/f02.htm> (visited Jan. 23, 2000) (a national
law of the PRC, widely recognized as Hong Kong's "mini-constitution," which entered into
force on Apr. 4, 1990) [hereinafter Basic Law].
8 For example, HKSAR Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa recognizes that "Hong Kong

must retain the special features of a cosmopolitan city in order to attract foreign investment
as well as tourists," while maintaining and improving the English-language abilities of
Hong Kong's people is "one of the prerequisites for Hong Kong to become the leading
cosmopolitan city of Asia." CE Meets Legislators (visited Oct. 26, 1999)
<http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199901/04/0104180.html>.
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Central People's Government under this Law." 9 The detailed grant of
external affairs powers to the HKSAR is provided in Chapter VII of the
Basic Law, entitled "External Relations." 10 In general, the HKSAR's
external autonomy is concerned mostly with economic and cultural matters.
For example, the HKSAR may on its own develop external relations and
conclude international treaties with foreign states and regions and relevant
international organizations "in the appropriate fields, including the economic,
trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communications, tourism, cultural
and sports fields." 11 The HKSAR may also participate in its own right in
international organizations and conferences that are not limited to states.' 2 In
non-economic or cultural fields, the HKSAR is granted a number of powers;
it is, for example, authorized to issue HKSAR passports and manage its own
immigration control. 13 The courts of the HKSAR - in handing down rulings
under Hong Kong's British-common-law-influenced judicial system - may
refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions, 14 judges and other

members of the judiciary of the HKSAR may be recruited from other
common law jurisdictions,15 and judges from other common law jurisdictions
16
may be invited to sit on the HKSAR Court of Final Appeal (CFA).
In sum, from treaty power 7 to separate membership in international
organizations; 8 from management of transborder movement of goods and
services 19 to control of international shipping and air transportation; 20 from
9 Basic Law, supra note 7, at art. 62.
10

Id. arts. 150-57.

"' Id. art. 151.
12 See id. art. 152.
3 See id. art. 154.

14 See id. art. 84.
15 See id. art. 92.
16 See id. art. 82.

17 By July 1999, the HKSAR had concluded some 70 bilateral agreements of its own
with more than 40 countries throughout the world. The subject matter of the agreements
included air services, investment promotion and protection, surrender of fugitive offenders,
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, and transfer of sentenced persons. For a list of
these agreements, see The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and External Affairs
(visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http:/www.info.gov.hk/info/exaffa.htm>.
18Hong Kong is, for example, a full, independent member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and of the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
19The HKSAR shall "be a separate customs territory" and "pursue the policy of free
trade and safeguard the free movement of goods, intangible assets and capital." Basic Law,
supra note 7, at arts. 116 & 115.
20 The HKSAR shall "maintain Hong Kong's previous systems of shipping management
and shipping regulation ... " and "continue to maintain a shipping register ... " Id. arts. 124

& 125. It shall also "continue the previous system of civil aviation management in Hong
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international financial cooperation 21 to transnational legal assistance;2 from
issuance of the HKSAR passport to immigration control; from use of
English as an official language 3 to the reference of precedents of other
common law jurisdictions in Hong Kong courts; from overseas judges sitting
in the HKSAR's courts, including the CFA,24 to government civil servants
possessing foreign citizenship and/or the right of abode in foreign states;25
and from its own overseas presence u to foreign representation in Hong

Kong and keep its own aircraft register ..."; and "may negotiate and conclude ... air
service agreements ... with foreign states" in regard to all scheduled air services to, from,
or through Hong Kong, which do not operate to, from, or through the mainland of China.
Id. arts. 129 & 133.
21 The HKSAR "shall provide an appropriate economic and legal environment for the
maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an international financial center." Id. art. 109.
22 Article 96 of the Basic Law provides that the HKSAR "may make appropriate
arrangements with foreign states for reciprocal juridical assistance." Id. art. 96. However,
Hong Kong's competence to sign and enforce its extradition agreements with the United
States has been challenged in both the United States and the HKSAR courts before and
after the hand-over. For a summary of an earlier case, see James D. Wilets, Lui v. United
States, 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 1997), 91 AM. J. INTL L. 539 (1997). For a report of two
recent cases, see Angel Lau, Fight Against ExtraditionLost, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct.
27, 1999, at 2.
23 Article 9 of the Basic Law provides that "[iln addition to the Chinese language,
English may also be used as an official language .
Basic Law, supranote 7, at art. 9.
24 As of November 1999, there were six judges from other common law jurisdictions

(two each from Australia, New Zealand, and the U.K.) appointed as non-permanent judges
of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal: The Honourable Sir Anthony Mason; The Right
Honourable Lord Cooke of Thomdon; The Right Honourable Sir Edward Somers; The
Honourable Sir Daryl Dawson; The Honourable the Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead; and The
Honourable the Lord Hoffmann. See Judges of Court of Final Appeal (visited Nov. 29,
1999) <http'//www.info.gov.hk/jud/guide2cs/html/cfa/judgelst.htm>. When a three-judge
panel of the Court of Appeal upheld, on July 29, 1997, the legality of the Provisional
Legislative Council, the New York Times reported that "[i]ndeed, remarkably, only one of
the three judges was Chinese, making this the first time that judges of foreign nationality
have deliberated on Chinese laws; all Hong Kong's judges retained their appointments after
China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1." Edward A. Gargan, Hong Kong
Court Upholds China'sRule, N. Y. TIMEs July 30, 1997, at 10.
2 However, only those foreign nationals previously serving in public service in Hong
Kong may continue to be employed in the HKSAR. See Basic Law, supra note 7, at art.
101.

26 See SAR
Beijing Office Formally Opens (visited Oct. 17, 1999)
<http'//www.info.gov.hklgia/general199903/04/0304offe.htm>. Hong Kong maintains ten
official economic and trade offices in eight countries. The HKSAR also established a
mainland China office, the Office of the Government of the HKSAR in Beijing, on March
4, 1999. See id.
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Kong;27 the HKSAR can be seen to enjoy probably the most extensive
external autonomy that has ever existed in an autonomous region in the
world, historical or current.
Most commentators generally agree that the HKSAR enjoys a high
degree of external autonomy that far outstrips the powers granted to other
subnational entities in other states. 28 In a comparative study of the foreign
affairs powers of autonomous regions in the world, Hannum, an
acknowledged authority on autonomy, has generally "ranked" Hong Kong as
third - behind two Soviet republics and the Free Territory of Trieste - in
terms of the formal, autonomous, foreign affairs powers granted by
international treaty or domestic law.2 9 However, the proposed Free Territory
of Trieste never became a reality. Meanwhile, as for the Ukrainian SSR and
Byelorussian SSR, "[d]espite . . .formal membership . . . in the United
30
Nations and their adherence to numerous international agreements,"
international law scholars have generally treated them as a pragmatic
exception - an example of political expediency - rather than a valuable
precedent.31 Although current international law practices do not support any
27

There are almost 100 foreign consular and other official and semi-official missions in

the HKSAR. An official list of foreign representation in the HKSAR is available at
<httpl/www.info.gov.hk/isd/hk99/ewww/app/appO5/index.htm>.
Although
the
establishment of these missions in the HKSAR needs China's approval, see Basic Law,
supra note 7, at art. 157, the HKSAR is responsible for the day-to-day management of
foreign missions. For example, on November 9, 1999, a HKSAR court denied the
diplomatic immunity claim of Solomon Dominic Musa, the principle immigration officer of
Sierra Leone, who was accused of selling three diplomatic passports illegally to an
undercover agent, "based on an order endorsed by the Chief Executive that Musa did not
enjoy that right." See Magdalen Chow, Inununity Refused in Passport-Selling Case, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 10, 1999, at 5.
28 See, e.g., Remarks of Hurst Hannum, supra note 5, at 364 (commenting that Hong
Kong approaches "the status of an independent state," being very close to the end of the
"continuum" - of autonomous arrangements in the world "that varies from entities which
merely have power over personal status or perhaps culturally autonomous groups to
autonomous arrangements that are extremely difficult to distinguish from fully independent
states").
29 Hurst Hannum, The Foreign Affairs Powers of Autonomous Regions, 57 NORDIC J.

INT'LL. 273, 273-77 (1988).
30 Id. at 274.
31 See, e.g., PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCrION TO INTERNATIONAL

LAw 81 & n.53 (7th rev. ed. 1997) (commenting that the "purpose and effect" of amending
the Soviet Union's constitution to permit the Ukraine and Byelorussia to become U.N.
members was simply "to give the U.S.S.R. three votes instead of one"). See also ROSALYN
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF

THE UNITED NATIONS 16-17 (1963); HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY 50 (3rd rev. ed 1995).

Hannum himself has acknowledged that "it is difficult to speak of any meaningful
autonomy in the conduct of their international relations." HANNUM, supra note 29, at 274.

2000]

THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

7

autonomous region with the kind of formal external relations powers similar
to that held by the Ukrainian SSR and Byelorussian SSR, it has been argued
that Hong Kong should be able to accede to multilateral treaties and
participate in international organizations independently even though the
parties and members of these treaties and organizations are limited to
sovereign states. For example, in an article examining environmental issues
in Hong Kong and their relationship to the Basic Law, Benjamin Liebman
has argued that the HKSAR should have the same status in international
32
environmental agreements and organizations as it has in the WTO.
Liebman's argument, although limited to environmental issues, would
certainly give the HKSAR's external autonomy a qualitative leap forward if
accepted and implemented. He believes that it is necessary for Hong Kong to
have independent status in international environmental agreements and
organizations because the Basic Law fails to: (a) acknowledge the need for
third party consent in determining Hong Kong's status in such agreements
and organizations; and (b) consider the ways that the PRC may influence
Hong Kong's environmental and trade policies indirectly, thus, undermining
HKSAR autonomy. Second, he suggests that Hong Kong may acquire such a
status anyway, since the Basic Law also fails to: (c) account for Hong
Kong's development status ("developed," as opposed to "developing") in
international agreements; (d) contemplate the interrelation of trade issues
with environmental issues and the possibility that, by granting autonomy to
Hong Kong in the WTO, the Basic Law may also grant autonomy in
environmental external policy; and (e) take account of the different status of
international treaties in Hong Kong and China and the possibility that such
differences may allow Hong Kong's Legislative Council (LegCo) de facto
33
veto power over international agreements applied to Hong Kong by China.
We find Liebman's argument unpersuasive.
It is correct to point out that there is a dilemma in applying a PRC
treaty to Hong Kong if the HKSAR is unwilling to accede to it while the
treaty, by its terms, requires application to all of China, such as in the case
of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) and of the
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992). 34 It is also true that the Basic
32

Benjamin L. Liebman, Autonomy Through Separation?: Environmental Law and the

Basic Law of Hong Kong, 39 HARV. INT'LL. J. 231,272 (Winter 1998).
31 See id. at 234-5.
34 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31
LL.M. 849, 851 (1992). See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 3, 31
LL.M. 818, 824 (1992). China ratified both treaties on January 5, 1993. At Hong Kong's
request, Britain did not apply the two conventions to Hong Kong when it ratified the two
conventions in 1992. See Liebman, supra note 32, at 257-58 & n.130. In contrast, Portugal
informed the U.N. Secretary-General that the two conventions would apply to Macau on
June 28, 1999. On December 15, 1999, China informed the U.N. Secretary-General that
the two conventions would continue to apply to Macau SAR with effect from December 20,
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Law neither provides for nor forbids China to seek its treaty partners'
consent in determining Hong Kong's status in such a situation.35 However,
Liebman fails to give any plausible reason why his suggested solution - that
the HKSAR participate in international environmental treaties in its own
right - should be established as an international law precedent. On the
contrary, attempts by the PRC to work with its treaty partners to exclude
Hong Kong from a treaty that causes such a dilemma should not be
interpreted as undermining "the Basic Law's statement that Hong Kong 'is
an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China,"' 36 but rather as the
PRC, in its discretion as the HKSAR's sovereign, choosing to make
exceptional rules for Hong Kong.
It is, moreover, at best superficial to argue that, as China can exert
indirect influence on Hong Kong's environmental policy, the HKSAR's
autonomy in environmental policy is ephemeral and an independent status for
the HKSAR in international environmental treaties and organizations is
necessary. 37 Liebman cites as an example of China's indirect influence the
fact that the PRC's ban on the import of hazardous wastes in the summer of
1996, under the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,38 forced Hong Kong

1999, the date of Macau's return to the PRC. See United Nations Framework on Climate
Change (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http'//untreaty.un.orglENGLISHIbible/englishinternetbible/
partl/chapterXXVll/treaty22.asp>; Convention on Biological Diversity (visited Feb. 5,
2000)<http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXXVUltreat
y24.asp>.
35 Article 153 of the Basic Law states only that:

The application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of international
agreements to which the People's Republic of China is or becomes a party shall be
decided by the Central People's Government, in accordance with the circumstances and
needs of the Region, and after seeking the views of the government of the Region.
International agreements to which the People's Republic of China is not a party but
which are implemented in Hong Kong may continue to be implemented in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. The Central People's Government shall, as
necessary, authorize or assist the government of the Region to make appropriate
arrangements for the application to the Region of other relevant international
agreements.
Basic Law, supra note 7, at art. 153.
36 Liebman, supra note 32, at 260.
31

See id. at 273.

38 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989), also available at
http'J/www.tufts.edu/fletcher/multi/texts/BH937.txt>.
The U.K. applied the Basel
Convention to Hong Kong in 1995. China signed the convention in 1991 and agreed that
the convention would continue to apply to Hong Kong after 1997.
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to implement - ahead of time - its own law3 9 on shipments of both foreign
waste through Hong Kong to China and Hong Kong's own waste to China.
However, at the time both China and (British) Hong Kong had independent
international obligations to take measures to control transboundary
movements of hazardous waste under the Basel Convention and, in making
such "transboundary" policies, could be expected to influence one another no
matter what status Hong Kong had then or has now (or in the future). It
requires a huge leap to conclude that, since China's implementing measures
appeared to have influenced Hong Kong's implementing measures, the
HKSAR's autonomy in environmental policy as it exists now is somehow
ephemeral and, therefore, Hong Kong should have an independent status in
international environmental treaties.
Regarding Hong Kong's arguably different development status from
that of China in treaties, such a distinction in and of itself does not justify
full and independent membership for the HKSAR in international
environmental agreements. The assertion that, since the I-KSAR participates
in the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment independently and
contributes its own international environmental policy in that context, 4° so
should it also in international environmental agreements and organizations,
reflects confusion in analysis of, rather than any incoherence in, the Basic
Law. The Basic Law clearly contemplates and provides for the HKSAR's
status as a non-state player in various international arenas. As such, the
HKSAR can always make and implement its own autonomous environmental
policy no matter whether it is represented as a separate member in the WTO
due to its status as a separate customs territory or as part of the PRC
delegations to international environmental organizations due to its status as
an SAR of the PRC; 4 1 or, whether it signs international environmental
agreements autonomously in the WTO context or is bound by them through
the consent of the PRC.
Finally, Liebman exaggerates the consequences of the different status of
treaties in the HKSAR and PRC legal systems. He claims that Hong Kong's
common law tradition, in which treaties have to be incorporated by
legislation to be effective locally, may allow the HKSAR LegCo de facto
39 See Hong Kong Ordinance No. 14 (Waste Disposal (Amendment) Ordinance) (1995),

Ch. 354, §§20A-20L Hong Kong enacted this ordinance in order to bring its laws into line
with the Basel Convention. Originally, it had intended to implement the new regulation by
the end of 1996, but implementation began earlier in that year, after the PRC's action. See
Liebman, supra note 32, at 274-75.
4o Liebman contends that "either Hong Kong must possess autonomy in international
environmental policy, or else Hong Kong's autonomy in the WTO must be limited."
Liebman, supra note 32, at 272.
41 Even as a part of the PRC delegations to international organizations, the Hong Kong
delegates speak for Hong Kong and make policy statements of the HKSAR autonomously
in the name of "Hong Kong, China."
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veto power over international treaties applied to Hong Kong by China especially international environmental treaties on which the HKSAR's
legislature is willing to disregard Beijing's dictates 42 - by refusing to enact
local implementing legislation. However, his claim fails on two counts. First,
China has never dictated in the past, or indicated that it intends to dictate in
the future, that the HKSAR apply the PRC's environmental protection
treaties. As Liebman himself acknowledges, China did not force the HKSAR
to abide by the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
Convention on Biological Diversity even though China had the best excuse to
do so because both conventions require that the PRC apply their provisions
to all of China.4 3 Nor does Basic Law Article 153 in any sense imply, as he
suggests, that China will somehow force the HKSAR to abide by PRC
treaties. Second, even though it is conceivable that there might be occasions
where the HKSAR LegCo were to take issue in the future with the HKSAR
executive administration's decision to abide by a PRC treaty - after
consultation between the administration and the central government in
accordance with Article 153 of the Basic Law - it is doubtful how
meaningful this "veto" would be both internationally and locally. From an
international law point of view, the "veto" could not excuse the HKSAR
from its international treaty obligation at all. In fact, the common law
tradition (not China) would dictate that the HKSAR abide by the treaty
internationally, in spite of the LegCo's "veto." 44 Locally, Basic Law Article
50 provides that if the LegCo refuses to pass important legislation, the
HKSAR Chief Executive may then choose to dissolve the LegCo. 45 Given
the clear meaning of Basic Law Article 153 and China's consistent practice,
and given the fact that environmental protection is a legitimate and
increasingly popular cause in the HKSAR, 46 neither a threat to veto the

42

See Liebman, supra note 32, at 278.

43 As a more recent example, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress

(NPCSC) decided on December 29, 1998 to ratify the Minimum Age Convention (1973)
(ILO Convention No. 138). Significantly, the NPCSC declared that, until announced
otherwise, the convention will not apply to the HKSAR. See The NPCSC's Decision to

Ratify the Minimum Age Convention, PEOPLE3 DAILY (Overseas Edition)

[RENMiN RIBAO

(HAsWAIBAN)I], Dec. 30, 1998, at 4.
44 According to common law, "[t]he negotiation and conclusion of international
agreements is an exclusive prerogative function of the Queen and her Ministers: moreover,
an international agreement so concluded will be binding on the Commonwealth country
whether or not internal legislation is enacted to implement it." See J. E. S. FAwCETr, THE
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

56 (1963).

45 See Basic Law, supra note 7, at art. 50.
46 It has been asserted that "Hong Kong people are now much more aware of
environmental problems and are expecting something to be done about them." Such
increased public awareness seems to be reflected by pollution complaints received by the
government in Hong Kong, which have been rising rapidly in number over the last five
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HKSAR administration's international environmental commitments by the
LegCo, nor a threat to dissolve the LegCo by the Chief Executive, would
ever occur lightly.
B.
Hong Kong's Strengths and Constraints in Shaping its
ExternalAutonomy
Hong Kong's strengths in shaping its external autonomy come directly
from its international character. It is without a doubt one of the most
important international cities in Asia and it does not hide its ambition to
become "the premier international city in Asia in the 21st Century, ' '47 "a
world city" of its own.48 Hong Kong's major international characteristics,
which have formed the foundation of Hong Kong's external relations include
the facts that: many Hong Kong Chinese speak English and possess foreign,
particularly British, passports which facilitate their international contact; 49
Hong Kongers live in a modem metropolitan community that is also home to
many foreign nationals and businesses; 50 and, most importantly, Hong Kong
people work in an externally oriented economy, which transformed Hong
Kong into a well known international financial, business, and trade center.
To accommodate Hong Kong's British-influenced international
character, the HKSAR became the first autonomous region in China to be
granted external autonomy. Hong Kong's international character not only
makes the external autonomy of the HKSAR possible but it also underlies its
prominence. In fact, as one of the most important non-state players in the
modem world economy, Hong Kong's extensive autonomous external
activities have arguably produced - and will likely continue to produce more significant international impact than that of the external activities of
other autonomous regions. Today, the HKSAR's influence accompanies its
leaders and official delegations abroad nearly every day as they meet and
interact with foreign leaders and delegations. It is more than symbolic when
Hong Kong, the world's tenth largest trading economy (sixth largest, if

years. See Hong Kong Becomes More Environmentally Conscious, (visited Jan. 13, 2000)
<http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199902/23/0223100.htm>.
47 For the HKSAR Chief Executive's speech at the World Economic Forum on February
1, 1999, see Hong Kong to be Asia's MajorInternationalCity, CE Tells WEF (visited Oct.

25, 1999) <http'/www.info.gov.hklgia/general/199901/30/0130019.htm>.
48

Chris Yeung, Lawmakers Back Tung's 'Big Vision' Blueprint, S. CHNA MoRNnio

POST, Oct. 28, 1999, at 1.
49 According to the Immigration Department of the HKSAR, as of the end of December
1997, around 3.5 million British National (Overseas) (BN(O)) passports were in
circulation. The HKSAR Immigration Department report is available at Travel Documents
(visited Oct. 25, 1999) <http'//www.info.gov.hk/info/traldoc.htm>.
50

The United States alone has some 35,000 citizens in the HKSAR. See Mid-Year

Population(visited Jan. 31, 2000) <http'J/www.info.gov.hk/hkbi/enghkbi/12/12-2a.htm>.
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European Union (EU) countries are regarded as one entity) 51 - China is the
nineth largest 52 - speaks as a full member in the WTO, while China is still in
the process of applying for WTO membership. It is also impossible to ignore
the physical evidence of Hong Kong's international influence in its
numerous, overseas, official or semi-official offices and in the ubiquity of its
people and investments worldwide. Other existing autonomous regions in the
world and few if any in the past, simply cannot compare.
Nevertheless, the HKSAR's external autonomy is also under legal,
political, and economic constraints. The legal constraints result from the
reality that the PRC is the sovereign power and that the HKSAR is a nonstate player. Thus, even though the HKSAR's external powers and
autonomy are unprecedented for a non-state player, it has limited
international capacities and cannot do many things that the smallest and least
important states can do, such as casting a vote in the U.N.. Moreover,
although, as an international financial and services center with a GNP almost
open sixth of China's, Hong Kong's place in the regional and world economy
is more important than that of many sovereign states, overall it has a limited
role in international relations in a world where sovereign states still hold
sway, notwithstanding the widespread empowerment of non-state actors such
as international organizations.
The political constraints on Hong Kong's external autonomy originated
from its colonial history. Although it has been known as a political (as well
as non-political) refugee haven, it has also been portrayed as an apolitical
society. Internally, the British colonial government in Hong Kong simply did
not permit Hong Kong residents any chance for political activism until the
controversial, political reform plan of Britain's last governor there,
Christopher Patten, was introduced and implemented in the final years of the
U.K.'s rule.53 Externally, Hong Kong's relations with China since 1949,
although not without political conflicts, have often been described as being
mutually beneficial economically. Hong Kong survived the Cold War by
serving as a window between East and West, rather than as an outpost of
anti-Communism. While Hong Kong was governed by the U.K., which
maintained an embargo against the PRC from early in the Korean War on,
Hong Kong continued to trade with China and became an important source
of foreign currency and material goods for the latter. And internationally,
Hong Kong - an influential economic but non-state player - was largely
immune from world politics. It had essentially no power, and its people
51 For the WTO's website regarding this, see Leading Exporters and Importers in
World
Merchandise
Trade,
<http'//www.wto.org/wto/intltrad/998

1998

(visited

Jan.

18,

2000)

appl.htm>.
52 See id.

53 Patten's reform plan drew the PRC's strong opposition. See JONATHAN DIMBLEBY, THE
LAST GOVERNOR: CHRIS PATrEN & THE HANDOVER OF HONG KONG 114-38 (1997).
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generally evinced little interest, in international politics. 54 All these factors
effectively prevented Hong Kong from playing any meaningful international

political role in spite of its great economic strength.
The notion of Hong Kong as an apolitical society has been challenged,
however, certainly since the profound reaction there regarding the tragic
Tiananmen Incident in the summer of 1989. The record high turnout of

voters in the first HKSAR LegCo election in May 1998 showed that political

interest and participation in Hong Kong has been on the rise.55 But it seems
that the change of political landscape within Hong Kong has not changed the
constraints on its external politics. First, in China's view, the "one country,
two systems" design is clearly meant to separate politics in Hong Kong and
China. As the Chinese saying goes, "well water does not intrude into river
water., 56 Second, since July 1, 1997, while the PRC has refrained from
intervening in the HKSAR's affairs, such as the free election of the first
LegCo of the HKSAR, it has also vigilantly guarded against any undue
foreign political influence in Hong Kong. China continues to resist attacks on
the Basic Law's gradual approach to the HKSAR's democratization and
opposes any overt politicization of Hong Kong.57 Third, even though Hong
Kong may from time to time be involved or even dragged into world
politics,58 it continues to lack political power (the power being held in

54 It has often been reported that Hong Kong residents are generally not interested in
world politics. See, e.g., Ting Wai, The External Relations and InternationalStatus of
Hong Kong, OCCASIONAL P~A'EPs R/REPnrrs SEPms iN CoNTEMP. AsL.N STuD., No. 2-1997
(139), at 12.
55 See Mark Landler, Hong Kong ConfrontsDemocracy: How Soon?, N.Y. TIMEs, May
27, 1998, at A6.
56 For example, China has barred Hong Kong's anti-Beijing political
figures from
visiting China. See Barred Activists Still Await Answers From Mainland, HONG KONG
STANDARD, Apr. 14, 1999, availablein LEXIS, News Library.
57 See Roda Mushkat, The Future of Hong Kong's International Legal Personality:
Does InternationalLaw Matter? A Post-HandoverSnapshot, 22 S. ILl.. U. L. J. 275, 277,
285-87 (1998) (commenting on the PRC's "decidedly low profile" and "hands-off' posture
toward Hong Kong since the handover from Great Britain). China protested the British
Counselor General's meetings with some candidates from Hong Kong's democratic camp
before the May 1998 LegCo election and criticized these activities as interventionist.
Recently, the PRC also criticized the remarks as "inappropriate" of the new U.S. consulgeneral in Hong Kong, Michael Klosson, concerning the state of Hong Kong's democracy,
the right of abode issue, and China's refusal to permit the Pope's visit to Hong Kong. See
China Reminds U.S. to Keep Out of Hong Kong's InternalAffairs, Agence France Press,
Oct. 28, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library.
58 Clearly, Hong Kong both benefits and suffers from the "weather" of Sino-U.S.
relations. An American campaign-year distortion of Hong Kong's overseas influence was
highlighted by a recent congressional hearing on "allegations made by the Republican
Party's right wing that [Hong Kong's] Hutchison Whampoa" would "hand China control
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Beijing), if not interest, and the link between Hong Kong and the rest of the
world continues to be in fundamentally economic, rather than political,
terms.
Indeed, as a tiny, natural-resource-challenged territory, Hong Kong's
greatest international strengths have always been its strategic location and its
unusually effective and powerful economic performance. Being politically
impotent in its relations with the world, it almost goes without saying that
Hong Kong's external autonomy would not be so prominent if it did not have
such a robust, externally-oriented economy. However, as another Chinese
saying goes, "water not only navigates, but also sinks," and weak economic
performance could, obversely, impose constraints on Hong Kong's external
autonomy. To put it another way, any persistent weakening of Hong Kong's
economy will surely erode its international status and eventually hurt the
significance of its external autonomy.
Unfortunately, during the two years of the HKSAR, a number of
unhappy economic events caused some serious damage to Hong Kong and to
its overseas image. The biggest blow to the HKSAR was the economic
recession it suffered, soon after the handover from Britain, under the impact
of the "Asian Financial Crisis." 59 Hong Kong is also certainly not without
competitors. While Hong Kong's economy has been battered, there have
been steadily occurring signs that Hong Kong's dynamic neighboring
competitors - such as Shanghai, Singapore, and Taipei, as well as others are all stepping up their challenges to the position of the HKSAR. 6°
over the strategically important waterway [the Panama Canal]." Glenn Schloss, SAR,
Mainland 'Blurred, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 27, 1999, at 5.
59 On July 2, 1997, one day after the handover, the Thai baht was devalued and sparked
a severe financial crisis across Asia. A clear sense of the severe impact of the crisis on
Hong Kong at that point and as time passed was conveyed by the acknowledgment of
HKSAR Financial Secretary Donald Tsang, on a trip to Europe at the end of August 1998,
of how much Hong Kong's stock market capitalization had fallen - a whopping U.S. $304
billion to U.S. $251 billion - from where it stood at the end of August 1997 (U.S. $555
billion). Property prices also dropped by more than 50 percent. Rents fell by about the
same percentage, back to levels at which they had been seven or eight years earlier. See
Speech by Financial Secretary in the Hague (visited Jan. 3, 2000)
<http:/www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199810/01/1001006.htm>.
60 For example, the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) re-launched a
Hong Kong equity futures contract on November 23, 1998. The expansion of SIMEX
contracts is in line with the Singapore government's plans to expand Singapore's role as a
regional financial center, at the expense of Hong Kong. See Barry Porter, Singapore Raises
Stakes in Exchange Battle, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 6, 1998, at 6. In addition, as the
Chief Secretary for Administration, Mrs. Anson Chan, recently told Australia's National
Press Club: "I am aware that Australia has ambitions to become Asia's premier financial
center outside of Japan, a position Hong Kong currently occupies. We acknowledge your
claim. We are ready for the challenge." See Chief Secretaryfor Administration Lays out
HK Facts - and a Challenge, (visited Jan. 17, 2000) <http:/www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/
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Some of the bad news coming from Hong Kong since the recession was
interpreted as showing signs of poor administration by the new HKSAR
government. For example, the crippling operational problems at Hong
Kong's expensive new Chek Lap Kok International Airport in July 1998 led
to paralysis of the air cargo terminal for more than a month. 6' However,
since the summer of 1998, the operation of the airport has improved
significantly. A recent opinion survey commissioned by the HKSAR Airport
Consultative Committee shows that the majority of people responding to the
survey have given high scores for the level of services provided at the new
airport. During the 1998 Christmas season, the airport handled one hundred
thousand passengers a day, and the once troubled Super Terminal One cargo
facility is handling an average of 5,000 tons of cargo a day. 62 In early 1999,
the magazine Travel & Leisure ranked the airport as "one of the world's
premier airports" in its annual Critics' Choice award. 63
Improved government administration arguably contributed to such a
turnaround. It is important for the HKSAR not only because of Deng
Xiaoping's proud cultural statement that "it is not true that only foreigners
can be good administrators. We Chinese are just as capable," 64 but also
because an effective external autonomy requires effective administration of
transportation and communication services, among other things. In fact, as
an international center for transport, trade, business, and tourism, Hong
Kong is very much dependent, for instance, on the operation of its airport.
Hong Kong not only faces significant internal difficulties, but also is
vulnerable to negative external influences. Perhaps the most serious test for
the HKSAR's administration was its massive and risky intervention in the
stock and futures markets in late 1998.65 It is estimated that the Hong Kong
199911/24/1124284.htm>.
61 It was estimated that this would cost the HKSAR about one percent of its annual
GNP. Another notorious example was the deadly outbreak of bird flu in December 1997,
which necessitated the slaughter of some 1.6 million chickens. The good news is, however,
that nineteen world flu experts issued a joint declaration at the end of 1998, praising the
previous year's emergency measures taken by the HKSAR government and people as a
"model for the world" and stating that they may well have prevented a disastrous spread of
the deadly flu throughout the world. See World Flu Experts Appreciate the Successful
Control of the Bird Flu in Hong Kong, PEOPLE'S DAILY (Overseas Edition) (Dec. 17, 1998),

at 5.
62 See ACC Survey Shows High Scores for Airport Services (visited Oct. 25, 1999)
<http'//www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199812/18/1218095.htm>.
63 See Richard Meier et al., The Critics' Choice Awards, TRAVEL& LEISuRE, Jan. 1999,

at 94.
64 DENG XIAOPING, supra note 1, at 10.

65See One Country, Two Systems, Big Crisis, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 1, 1998, at
20, available in LEXIS, News Library. The HKSAR government decided on December 15,
1998 to dispose, in an orderly fashion, of the stocks acquired in its massive anti-speculation
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Monetary Authority (HKMA) spent more than HK$100 billion (some U.S.
$14 billion) of the HKSAR's enormous reserves (U.S. $88.6 billion as of
November 1998)66 to buy stocks and futures and keep share prices at levels
that punished international speculators betting on a decline.
Initially, only China and the U.K. openly supported the HKSAR's
intervention in the stock and futures markets in late August 1998.67
International reactions were generally critical, and the HKSAR's measure
was seen as a dangerous breach of free market principles. For example,
Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, a most outspoken supporter of Hong
Kong's free economy in the past, called the operation "insane" and suggested
that it was part of a plan to "socialize" Hong Kong.68 Less dramatic critics,
such as U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, feared that it
"would erode some of the extraordinary credibility that the Hong Kong
monetary authorities have achieved over the years," and hoped that it "was
an isolated episode." 69 The Heritage Foundation, which has ranked Hong
Kong as the world's freest economy for a number of years, maintained that
ranking in 1998 but admonished the HKSAR government to change its
course or surrender its top position.7 °
However, later world opinion moved toward a better understanding of
the HKSAR's motivations and, ultimately, a more favorable reaction to the
intervention. The facts seem to have borne out the necessity of the action in
the face of unprecedented, sophisticated, and coordinated transborder
attempts at manipulating HKSAR's financial markets. As the Times (of
London) pointed out approvingly, the HKSAR government's operation in the
stock and futures markets was a "spectacular intervention," and the "turning
point for China's financial centre. The hedge funds, which had been
spreading an unchecked plague from Bangkok to Moscow, were taken on
campaign of August 1998. See HKSAR Government Decides to Sell or Reduce Its Stocks,
PEOPLE'S DAILY (Overseas Edition) [RENMIN RIBAO (HAIWAIBAN)], Dec. 17, 1998, at 5.
66 See Hong Kong's Latest Foreign Currency Assets Figures Released (visited Oct. 25,
1999) <httpJ/www.info.gov.hkgia/general/199812/17/1217186.htm>.
67 See Sino-British Joint Group Meets in HK, CHINA DAILY, Sep. 18, 1998, available at
httpJ/www.chinadaily.com/cn/cndydb/1998/09/d2-198.il8.html>.
68 Erik Guyot, Hong Kong's Stock Intervention Is 'Insane,' Milton Friedman Says,

J. (Sept. 3, 1998), at Al9.
Jacob M. Schlesinger, Greenspan Says Global Rate Cut Isn't Planned: Fed Chief

WALL ST.
69

Provides No Clue About a U.S. Reduction Despite Slowing Growth, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17,
1998, at A2.
70 See BRYAN T. JOHNSON ET AL., HERITAGE FOuNDATION, 1999 INDEX OF EcONOMIC
FREEDOM (5th ed., 1998) available at <http:.//www.heritage.org/index/execsum.html>.

(visited Nov. 8, 1999). Hong Kong actually retained its number-one position in 1999, not
only in the Heritage Foundation ranking, but also in the ranking of several other
institutions. See FinancialSecretary Welcomes HK's Rating as World's Freest Economy
(visited Jan. 21, 2000) <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200001/11/0111164.htm>
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and beaten," and "the West... should be grateful to [the general directors of
the Hong Kong operation] Sir Donald Tsang, Hong Kong's Financial
Secretary, and to Joseph Yam, head of the monetary authority" for taking
"an enormous risk" that "paid off, making a big profit and sending the hedge
funds slinking away," having helped avoid the worst effects of the Asian
Financial Crisis.7 '
While fighting for the recovery of Hong Kong's first recession in 20
years, the HKSAR government also seized the "opportunity" of the
downturn to assemble a series of strategic policies to restructure its
economy. One of the HKSAR's most ambitious current endeavors is to build
a hi-tech future. It includes a HK$13 billion Cyberport,7 2 a science park,7 3
and the systematic efforts to commence the commercial application of
Chinese medicine.74 In addition to going hi-tech, the HKSAR government has
also successfully negotiated and signed a deal with the Walt Disney
Company to establish a Disneyland theme park in Hong Kong - the third
75
one outside the United States, after Paris and Tokyo - to promote tourism.
After more than two years of painful economic recession, there have at last
been strong signs of economic recovery in the HKSAR. Recent government
figures show that Hong Kong's economy had a surprisingly strong, trade-led
76
rebound in the third quarter of 1999, with surging growth of 4.5 percent.
Moreover, shortly after the U.S. and the PRC concluded a deal on China's
accession to WTO membership, the Hang77Seng index for the first time in 25
months climbed to the 15,000-point level. The initial offer of Hong Kong's
"Tracker Fund," used to dispose of some of the HKSAR government's
excess stock portfolio, was also three times more than the planned offering
size of HK$10 billion, coming in at HK$33 billion.78 All of this has restored
71

Hong Kong Shows How to Speculate, ThiMS (London), Oct. 27, 1998, at 31.

72

For a story of the project, see $13 Billion Cyberport ProjectAnnounced (visited Jan.

17, 2000) <http'//www.info.gov.hklga/general/199903/03/0303169.htm>.
73 See Provisional HK Science Park Company Limited Established (visited Jan. 18,
2000) <http'J/www.info.gov.hklgia/general/199807/07/0707107.htm>.
74 See Hong Kong's Hi-tech Future Outlined by Chief Executive in Silicon Valley,
(visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http'/www.info.gov.hk/gia/general1199907/23/0722157.htm>. For
measures taken to build a traditional Chinese medicine "port" in Hong Kong, see LCQ3:
Development of Chinese Medicine in Hong Kong (visited Jan. 18, 2000)
<http://www.info.gov.hkgia/general/199905/05/0505190.htm>.
75 See Angela Li & Stella Lee, $21b Disney Park Deal Sealed, S. CuNA MORNING POST,
Nov. 2, 1999, at 1.
76 See David Evans, U.S. Investment Bank Forecasts2pc Expansion in First Quarter,S.
CHINAMORNiNGPosT, Jan. 8,
77 See Suzanne Harrison,

2000, at 2.
HSI Soars Past 15,000, S.CMNA

MORNING POST,

Nov. 20,

1999, at 5.
78

See David Saunders, Tracker Fund to Stand at $33b, S.

9, 1999, at 1.

CHINA MORNING POST,Nov.
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much confidence to the HKSAR government, which claims that the "worst"
is over. Indeed, it appears that Hong Kong is now not only well poised to
enjoy and exploit its robust economy again, but is also much better prepared
to meet the challenges of globalization and the explosion of high technology
in the 21st century.
II. CHINA AND THE HKSAR's EXTERNAL AUTONOMY
One of the distinctive characteristics of the HKSAR's external
autonomy is its special Chinese dimension. On the one hand, as there is no
ethnic difference between the people of Hong Kong and the majority of
mainland Chinese, the HKSAR's external autonomy leads to additional
Chinese representation in some international institutions and fora. On the
other hand, even though Hong Kong is in a process of reintegration into,
rather than separation from, the PRC, many aspects of the HKSAR's
external autonomy - such as trade and immigration control - apply between
China and Hong Kong almost as between two separate countries.
Meanwhile, the "China" factor also looms large in the debate over the selfdetermination claim for the people of Hong Kong, as the issue relates to
China's actions over the years to reaffirm its sovereign claims on Hong
Kong, and the ultimate settlement of the Sino-British dispute over such
claims when the UK relinquished Hong Kong and returned it to China
completely in July 1997. Finally, although the HKSAR's external autonomy
has so far received strong backing from the PRC, the sovereign status of
China vis-A-vis the autonomous, regional status of the HKSAR ultimately
defines and determines the future of the HKSAR's external autonomy.
A.

The Chinese Dimension to the HKSAR's ExternalAutonomy

The HKSAR represents a rare case where a local community, which is
in fact ethnically part of the majority ethnic population in a sovereign state,
has acquired the status of an autonomous region within that state while the
rest of the majority ethnic population in the same state remains nonautonomous. The HKSAR is the first autonomous region in the PRC
established for the predominant ethnic community in China, the Han.79 All
other autonomous regions in China have been established for various
minority ethnic communities.8 ° Obviously, then, Hong Kong became an SAR
of the PRC not because its 98 percent Chinese population is different from
the rest of the majority population on the mainland in terms of ethnicity,
which is perhaps the most common reason to give a local minority
79 Macau became the second autonomous region established for the Han community in

China on December 20, 1999, when it returned to China after 400-plus years as a
Portuguese colony.
8o Hong Kong is called a special administrative region of the PRC, while other minority
communities in China are autonomous regions. See P.R.C. CONST. (1982) art. 31 and ch. 3.
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community autonomy. This helps explain why Hong Kong is called an SAR
rather than an autonomous region in China's Constitution.
One direct outcome of granting external autonomy to the HKSAR is
that China has to tolerate additional "Chinese" representation in certain
international institutions and fora such as the WTO, the World Customs
Organization and the ADB - all of which Hong Kong belongs to in its own
right, using the name "Hong Kong, China". Multiple Chinese international
representation in international institutions - "tripled" when Macau was
added at the end of 1999, and "quadruples" if Taiwan is counted 8' - is
unusual, and certainly unique in that it has been arranged without any
special considerations as to ethnicity.
While there is no ethnic difference between Hong Kongers and the Han
community on the Chinese mainland, and while the HKSAR is reintegrating
with China, many external autonomous arrangements designed for the
relations between Hong Kong and foreign states have also been applied to
the relations between Hong Kong and China. For instance, mainland Chinese
continue to need "visas" to visit the HKSAR. The trade between Hong Kong
and China is also treated as "foreign" trade. These arrangements enable
Hong Kongers to continue to enjoy more liberal and favorable treatments in,
for example, immigration and trade matters - as provided by the
international community - than their compatriots on the mainland.
For this reason, the special Chinese dimension of the HKSAR's external
autonomy is closely watched by other countries who bestow more liberal and
favorable treatments on Hong Kong. A good example is the May 1999 Cox
Report, which pointed out a number of cases unearthed by Hong Kong
customs authorities relating to violations of strategic trade controls. The
HKSAR government was quick to declare that for Hong Kong's own
interests, the HKSAR will maintain close cooperation with its major trading
partners in "combating the illegal diversion of strategic commodities. 8 2
B.
The Sino-British Sovereignty Dispute and the
Determination Controversy over Hong Kong

Self-

The status of Hong Kong was long a matter of dispute between Britain
and China. Hong Kong was a British colony for more than 150 years, after a
81

For example, Taiwan is also a member of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), using

the name "Taipei, China." Soon, it may well be the case that Hong Kong, Macau, China,
and Taiwan are all separate members of the WTO.
82 For the Cox Report, see Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security
and Military Commercial Concerns With the People's Republic of China, H. R. REP. No.
105-851 (1999) (visited Nov. 18, 1999) <http'//www.house.gov/coxreport>. For the
HKSAR government's response to the Cox Report, see Strategic Trade Controls, (visited
Nov.
18,
1999) <http'//www.info.gov.hkgeneral/199905/24/0524163.htm>,
and
"Government
Responds
to
Cox
Report,
(visited
Nov.
18,
1999)
<http'//www.info.gov.hklgeneral/199905/2610526165.htm>.
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royal charter in 1843 proclaimed it a Crown colony. 83 The official British
policy regarding the status of Hong Kong was based on the three 19th
century treaties with China. They are formally known as: (1) the Treaty of
Nanking 84 (1842), concluded after Britain defeated China in the Opium War
(1839-42); (2) the Treaty of Peking, 5 or "Convention of Friendship of
1860," by which Britain annexed Kowloon and Stonecutter's Island, facing
the island of Hong Kong; and (3) the Convention of Peking 86 (1898), or
"Convention Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory," by which
Britain, again taking advantage of China's physical and political
weaknesses, obtained in a 99-year rent-free "lease," to expire in July 1997, a
much larger area of land north of Kowloon, which later came to be known as
the "New Territories."
Britain regarded these treaties as legally binding documents that
legitimized British colonial rule there. Britain also insisted that, in particular,
sovereignty over Hong Kong island and Kowloon (as opposed to the New
Territories) was ceded to it by the Treaty of Nanking and the Treaty of
Peking. However, China, from the latter Qing Dynasty onward, rejected the
British occupation of Hong Kong as illegal and maintained that the three
treaties were null and void because they were "unequal treaties" imposed on
the Qing 8overnment by force and thus Hong Kong continued to be Chinese
territory.
The arguments of both the UK and the PRC have had unsettling
international law implications. Indeed, state practices and theorists were and remain - deeply divided on the concept of the "unequal treaty., 88 The
ambiguity on this issue actually helped both sides to insist on, rather than
settle, their cases in the name of international law. Thus, in the beginning of
the Sino-British negotiations on the post-1997 future of Hong Kong, Britain
insisted that, consistent with customary international law, treaties such as the
83 See Charter of the Colony of Hong Kong, Apr. 5, 1843, reprinted in 1 James William
Norton-Kyshe, HISTORY OF THE LAWS AND COURTS OF HONG KONG FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIODTO 1898 at 21-23 (1971).

84 Treaty of Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, Gr. Brit.-P.R.C., 93 Consol. T.S. 465.
85 Convention of Friendship Between China and Great Britain (Treaty of Peking), Oct.
24, 1860, Gr. Brit.-P.R.C., 123 Consol. T.S. 71.
86 Convention Between China and Great Britain Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong
Territory (Convention of Peking), June 29, 1898, Gr. Brit.-P.R.C., 186 Consol. T.S. 310.
87 Both the Republic of China (i.e., Taiwan) and PRC governments also laid consistent
claim to sovereignty over Hong Kong. See KEVIN P. LANE, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE STATUS

Quo:

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CHINAt HONG KONG POLICY 4 (1990).

88 Renowned international legal scholar Ian Brownlie has written that: "[w]hile
'Western' jurists oppose the doctrine on the ground that it is too vague, the principle is
regarded as entirely just by newly independent states, and it is no longer confined to the
thinking of jurists from Communist states." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAw 616 (4th ed. 1990).
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three 19th century Sino-British treaties on Hong Kong, were "made to be
kept," while China responded they were not. Later, as an alternative, the UK
proposed to give Hong Kong's sovereignty back to China in exchange for
continued British governance of Hong Kong. Again, China did not agree. In
the end, although Britain relinquished its "treaty rights," the Joint
Declaration seemingly saved face for both sides by juxtaposing China's
statement that it had decided to "resume the exercise of sovereignty over
Hong Kong" with the British declaration that it would "restore Hong Kong
to the People's Republic of China." 89
There can be no doubt that the final solution of the Sino-British
sovereignty dispute in China's favor should be attributed to a number of
non-legal factors, such as British post-World War ]Idecolonization policy,
the rise of a reformed and "open" China from the late 1970s onward, a
renewed perception of the importance of non-antagonistic Sino-British
relations, and the reality that Hong Kong could not survive without the
material support of the PRC. These factors, and others, and the manner in
which the sovereignty issue was dealt with in the Joint Declaration, in a
sense, left the legal issue of "unequal treaties" unresolved. Consequently, the
actions taken by China and Britain over the years to affirm their positions
have continued to engender controversy, as has the claim of selfdetermination for the people of Hong Kong.
The right to self-determination is a popular but controversial concept
that has been argued on behalf of many "peoples" around the world,
discussed in a rich body of literature, and defined in various international
treaties, including the Covenant of the League of Nations, the U.N. Charter,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
and several U.N. General Assembly resolutions. 90 The right to selfdetermination generally means that all peoples (especially in a colony or a
non-self-governing territory) can freely determine their political status - or
any other status - on the basis of their choice of independence from,
integration into, or free association with a state and can freely pursue their

89 Roda Mushkat, The Transition from British to Chinese Rule in Hong Kong: A
Discussion of Salient InternationalLegal Issues, 14 DENV. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 171, 179

(1986). See also Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at 1,2.
9o See, e.g., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960); Declarationon Principlesof InternationalLaw Concerning FriendlyRelations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.

Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 32:1

economic, social, and cultural development. 9' In other words, it means
freedom from foreign domination and attainment of full self-government.
Relying on this definition, a number of scholars have argued, both
before and after Hong Kong's return to China, that Hong Kong was and still
is entitled to the right to self-determination in spite of China's insistence on,
and the Joint Declaration's recognition of, PRC sovereignty over Hong Kong
because Hong Kong was: (1) a British Crown colony; (2) a non-selfgoverning territory under British administration; and (3) of distinct and
92
unique cultural identity during a century and a half of colonial existence.
Hence, the argument goes, the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from
the UK to the PRC without the freely-expressed consent of the Hong Kong
people violated the right to self-determination of those inhabitants, and the
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law lack legitimacy to foreclose that right.93
The above argument, to be sustainable, has to be based on the premise
that British colonial rule in Hong Kong, founded on the three 19th century
Sino-British treaties, was legitimate and that the Chinese sovereign claim to
Hong Kong was groundless. Such a premise is questionable, however. First,
as mentioned above, international law provides neither clear support for, nor
rejection of, the validity of the three treaties. As state practices and opinions
of international law scholars in regard to the "unequal treaties" doctrine are
divided along "East-West" and "North-South" lines, there is at least no
generally accepted conclusion on it. 94 Thus, while Hong Kong was under
British colonial rule from 1842 onward, China's determination to put "right
the wrongs of the Opium Wars" 95 made it clear that the question of Hong
Kong would remain an unresolved issue between the UK and China

91 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 173; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5.
92 See Roda Mushkat, Hong Kong As an InternationalLegal Person, 6 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 105,113 (1992); Nihal Jayawickrama, The Right of Self-Determination - a Time for
Reinvention and Renewal, 57 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 1,15-16 (1993); John W. Head,
Selling Hong Kong to China: What Happened to the Right of Self-Determination?, 46
KANs. L. REv. 283,301 (1998).
93 Mushkat also argues that the right to self-determination could justify the kinds of
international intervention used by the United States in Operation Just Cause in Panama and
the Grenada Invasion (interventions for the stated purpose of preserving democracy), or by
the U.N. in Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia (humanitarian interventions) against any invasion
from or military occupation by the PRC. See RODA MUSHKAT, ONE COUNTRY, Two
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITIES: THE CASE OF HONG KONG 11-15 (1997).

94 See BROWNLIE, supra note 88.
95 BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA et al., RED FLAG OVER HONG KONG 3 (1996).

20001

THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 23

throughout the colonial period after Qing.96 It was only resolved upon the
signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984, accommodating both China's claim
and the reality of Hong Kong after 150 years of British colonial existence.
While aiming at the promotion and protection of the right to selfdetermination, international legal documents concerning it, including two
international human rights covenants and the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, also emphasize that the
right's exercise should be "in conformity with the provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations" 97 and "[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is
incompatible with the purposes and principles of [that Charter]." 98
Accordingly, before the issue of sovereignty over Hong Kong was resolved
between China and the UK, any claim as to the right to self-determination of
the Hong Kong people was at best premature and at worst might arguably
have infringed upon China's national unity and territorial integrity. By the
same token, after the sovereignty issue was settled by the Joint Declaration,
the right was then preempted for all practical purposes.
The same rationale may have been behind the U.N.'s action to exclude
Hong Kong and Macau from the list of colonial territories by the General
Assembly's Special Committee on Colonialism. On March 10, 1972, shortly
after China resumed its seat in the U.N. in 1971, the PRC government sent a
letter to the Committee's Chairman stating that:
Hong Kong and Macao are part of Chinese territory occupied by the
British and Portuguese authorities. The settlement of the questions of
Hong Kong and Macao is entirely within China's sovereign rights and
does not fall under the ordinary category of colonial territories.
Consequently, they should not be included in the list of colonial
territories covered by the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and People.
With regard to the questions of Hong Kong and Macao, the Chinese
government has consistently held that they should be settled in an

96 All Chinese governments - no matter what their politics - after the fall of the Qing
Dynasty consistently maintained China's sovereign claim over Hong Kong. See LANE, supra
note 87, at 22, 55-58, 62-67.
97 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1 § 3, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 173; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, art. 1 § 3, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5.

98 Declarationon the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 67, U.N. Doec A/4684 (1961).
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appropriate way when conditions are ripe. The United Nations has no
right to discuss these questions. 99
China's position was subsequently accepted by the U.N. General
Assembly l'o and the General Assembly's Special Committee on101Colonialism
accordingly removed Hong Kong and Macau from the U.N. list.
Some advocates of the right to self-determination for the people of
Hong Kong have pointed to the 1975 decision of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in the Western Sahara Case, citing the ICJ's advisory opinion
to the effect that whatever legal ties may have existed at the time of
colonization they may not now stand in the way of the application of the
principle of self-determination, which has supposedly become a peremptory
norm of international law. 1°2 They assert that Hong Kong's legal ties with
China at the time of British colonization similarly may not now block the
application of the right to self-determination to the inhabitants of the
territory. 0 3 Yet, this is a subjective interpretation of the Western Sahara
opinion, which, in fact, stated at the end:
[T]he Court's conclusion is that the materials and information presented
to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the
territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the
Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a
nature as might affect the application of Resolution 1514 (XV)
[(December 14, 1960) of the U.N. General Assembly, containing the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples] in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of
the principle of self-determination

through the free and genuine

expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory. 1°4
The ICJ concluding statement indicates clearly that if the legal ties are
of the nature of territorial sovereignty, then they "might" affect the
application of the right to self-determination. Accordingly, the ICJ opinion is
in essence no different from that of international human rights documents
like the ICCPR and the ICESCR that uphold the principle of national unity
and territorial integrity in the exercise of the right to self-determination. This
99 Hong Kong Is Chinese Territory, PEOPLE' DAILY, [RENMIN RIBAO] Aug. 20, 1967, at
2 (letter cited in commentary), reprinted in JEROME A. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE'S
CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 384 (1974).
100 See

GA Res. 2978, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 80, U.N. Doc. A/8730

(1972).
101See Nihal Jayawickrama, The Right of Self-Determination, in HONG KONG'S BAsic
LAW: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 85, 88-89 (Peter Wesley-Smith ed., 1990).
'02 See id.
103 See id.

104 Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, at 68, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1355, at 1407
(emphasis added).

2000]

THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 25

natural reading of the opinion distinguishes Hong Kong from the Western
Sahara, as Hong Kong was not only under China's sovereignty at the time of
colonization by the UK but was also consistently claimed by China right up
to the end of Britain's period of colonial rule.
C.

China'sInfluence on Hong Kong's ExternalAutonomy

As the Sovereign power, China defines the HKSAR's external
autonomy and determines its future in many ways. The Basic Law draws a
distinction between foreign and external affairs. As Yash Ghai has pointed
out, the HKSAR's external powers:
...[a]re regarded in functional terms, not carrying connotations of
sovereignty or diplomacy. A distinction is implied between foreign
affairs, which are quintessentially matters of state and international
diplomacy, and external affairs, which appear to be concerned with
economic and cultural matters. The former expression is used when
referring to the responsibilities of the [PRC Central People's
Government] CPG (as in art. 13 [of the Basic Law]) and the latter when
referring to the powers of the HKSAR (in art. 13 as well as the title of
chapter VII).105
He states further that "[w]hen the powers of the HKSAR transgress
beyond the economic or cultural, some degree of specific authorization or
permission from the CPG is necessary, so that the Central Authorities are
able to control their exercise (as with the visa arrangements or the
establishment of consular offices in the HKSAR (art. 157))."' 06
China determines the interpretation of the Basic Law in case disputes
arise in regard to the meaning of its provisions. Basic Law Article 158
states:
The power of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress [NPCSC].
The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress shall
authorize the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to
interpret on their own, in adjudicating cases, the provisions of this Law
which are within the limits of the autonomy of the Region.
The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may
also interpret other provisions of this Law in adjudicating cases.
However, if the courts of the Region, in adjudicating cases, need to
interpret the provisions of this Law concerning affairs which are the
responsibility of the Central People's Government, or concerning the
relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region, and if such
105YASH

GHAi,

HONG KONGs NENw CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION OF CHINESE

SOVEREIGNTY AND THE

'06

Id., at 433-34.

BAsIc LAw 433 (1997) (emphasis in original).
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interpretation will affect the judgments on the cases, the courts of the
Region shall, before making their final judgments which are not
appealable, seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress through the
Court of Final Appeal of the Region. When the Standing Committee
makes an interpretation of the provisions concerned, the courts of the
Region, in applying those provisions, shall follow the interpretation of
the Standing Committee. However, judgments previously rendered shall
not be affected.
The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress shall
consult its Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
07
Administrative Region before giving an interpretation of this Law.
Clearly, although the HKSAR courts may be authorized by the NPCSC
to interpret the Basic Law, especially the provisions which are within the
limits of the autonomy of the region, it is the NPCSC which has the final
say, especially in regard to the interpretation of the provisions concerning the
powers of the CPG and the relationship between the Central Authorities and
the HKSAR. Thus, the distinction between "foreign" and "external" affairs
and the definitions of "relevant external affairs" and "appropriate fields" fall
under the responsibility of the NPCSC.I° 8
107 Basic

Law, supra note 7, at art. 158.

'0' In 1999, Article 158 of the Basic Law took the central stage of the HKSAR's first
constitutional "crisis" since the reunification, concerning the so-called "right of abode"
issue in Hong Kong. In its controversial judgment of January 29, 1999, Ling v. Directorof
Immigration
(visited
Jan.
15,
2000)
<http://www.info.gov.hk/jud/guide2cs/html/cfa/judmt/facv141698.htm>, also found at 1
H.K.L. REP. & DIG., Feb. 15, 1999, at 315 (Ct. of Final App., Jan. 29, 1999), the CFA held
that the restricted scheme for granting settlement in the HKSAR to eligible Mainland
Chinese (permitting the entrance of 150 Mainland residents per day, or over 55,000 per
year, for settlement in the HKSAR) violated their right of abode guaranteed by the Basic
Law. The judgment soon engendered fears in Hong Kong that an officially estimated 1.6
million eligible Mainland Chinese might flood the region in the next few years. After
initial hesitation on how to approach the situation - see, e.g., Right of Abode Issue (visited
Jan. 15, 2000)
<http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199905/14/0514218.htm> - the
HKSAR government finally decided on May 18, 1999 to request the NPCSC to interpret
Articles 22(4) and 24(2) and (3) of the Basic Law "in accordance with the true legislative
intent." See Right of Abode: The Solution (visited Oct. 17, 1999)
<http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199905/18/0518132.htm>. On June 26, 1999, the
"Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of Articles
22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China" was adopted at the Standing Committee's Tenth Session.
See Interpretationby the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of Article
22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the
People's
Republic
of
China
(visited
Jan.
17,
2000)
<http://www.info.gov.hk/basic-law/english/textO221.htm>. On December 3, 1999, the
same five CFA Justices who decided the earlier case (four Permanent Justices plus Sir
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The PRC also holds the key to possible grants of further external
autonomy powers to the HKSAR in the future. During the drafting of the
Basic Law, China refused to include in the Basic Law a proposed article to
the effect that Hong Kong would be given authority over all powers not
specifically vested in the Central Authorities (i.e., the National People's
Congress (NPC), the NPCSC, and the CPG). It is, therefore, the PRC - not
the HKSAR - which controls the so-called "residual" powers for
determining authority not expressly granted in the Basic Law. Chinese legal
experts argued that any vesting of residual powers in the HKSAR would be
inconsistent with the HKSAR's status as a local "administrative region," as
well as with the unitary nature of the Chinese state. 1°9 Accordingly, Basic
Law Article 20 states that: The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
may enjoy other powers granted to it by the National People's Congress, the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress or the Central
People's Government.110 Thus, whenever an unspecified power is needed and
has to be defined, the PRC's Central Authorities have the power to make
decisions on the matter in their discretion. The exercise of the residual
powers can either be granted to the HKSAR government or retained by the
Central Authorities.
The HKSAR's external autonomy is not without Chinese foreign policy
guidance. The issue of Hong Kong's relations with Taiwan is an instructive
example. At China's behest, immediately after the handover from Britain,
Hong Kong quit the Asian Productivity Organization because of Taiwan's
membership in it."' While the HKSAR government has an extraordinary
Anthony Mason, a Non-permanent Justice from another common law jurisdiction)
unanimously upheld the validity of the Standing Committee's interpretation in Yung and 16
Others v. the Director of Immigration. See Judiciary: CPA Judgment: Lau Kong Yung

(visited Jan. 17, 2000) <http'/www.info.gov.hk/jud/guide2cs/htrfl/cfa/judmt/facv_10_

1

99.htm>. Chief Justice Andrew Li-Kwok-nang stated: "It is clear that the Standing
Committee has the power to make the interpretation. This power originates from Article
67(4) of the Chinese constitution and is contained in Article 158(1) of the Basic Law
itself." It was "a valid and binding interpretation.. .which the courts in the HKSAR are
under a duty to follow." See Cliff Buddle, NPC Calls the Shots: Judges, S. CHINA MORNING

POST, Dec. 4, 1999, at 1. Despite all the controversy surrounding the right of abode issue,
its final resolution decisively confirmed the NPCSC's power of interpretation of the Basic
Law. See Government Statement on Court of Final Appeal Judgement (visited Jan. 17,
see
also
2000)
<http:J/www.info.gov.hktgia/generall199912/03/1203114.htm>;
Government Welcomes Court of Final Appeal Judgment (visited Jan. 17, 2000)

<http'/www.info.gov.hklgia/general/199912/03/1203238.htn>.
109 See Wu Jianfan, Several Issues Concerning the Relationship Between the Center of

the People's Republic of China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2 J.

CHmsEs L. 65, 74 (1988).
110 Basic Law, supra note 7, at art. 20 (emphasis added).
11 See Jonathan Braude, Pass for Patten's Benchmark Test, S. CHINA MORNING POST,

June 30, 1998, at 23.
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amount of freedom to make contact with foreign governments or with other
Chinese provincial or regional governments, particularly in the economic
arena, it has much less freedom to make official contact with the Taiwanese
government because of the high degree of PRC sensitivity where Taiwan is
concerned. 112 It also would be difficult for the HKSAR to take policy
positions to promote Taiwan's entry into the WTO ahead of the PRC, even if
Taiwan finishes its entry negotiations with WTO members before China, and
even if it would be in Hong Kong's own best interests to put its trade
relations with Taiwan under the WTO rules as early as possible." 3 Many
have worried that China's foreign policy guidance may excessively encroach
upon the HKSAR's external autonomy."' Given, however, the fact that the
current goal of the PRC's foreign policy is to create and maintain a stable
112See HK & Taiwan Authorities Only Operational Contacts (resent) (visited Oct. 17,
1999) <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199901/06/0106157.htm>.
The HKSAR
government's handling of Taiwan related issues is based on the seven fundamental
principles and policies declared by Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen in June 1995 and
summarized in HKSAR Secretary for Constitutional Affairs Michael Suen's written reply to
LegCo member Christine Loh Kung-wai's questions on January 6, 1999. See id.
113So far, Taiwan and the HKSAR have not completed entry negotiations, and Taiwan
appears concerned that Hong Kong may choose not to complete such negotiations, thus
making it difficult for Taiwan to enter the WTO ahead of the PRC. According to HKSAR
Secretary for Security Regina Ip: "the government of the HKSAR has long supported
Chinese Taipei's application for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. As an
open economy, Hong Kong attaches tremendous importance to the multilateral trading
system built on the basis of the WTO. It is also a fact that Chinese Taipei is our fourthlargest trading partner. Nonetheless .... the General Council of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the predecessor of the WTO) reached an understanding in 1992
that China's accession to GATT should precede that of Chinese Taipei. The government of
the HKSAR has all along abided by this understanding." See Regina ip's written reply to
LegCo member Fred Li Wah-ming's question on "whether the Government has supported
Taiwan's application for joining that Organisation .... " which is available at LCQ6:
Relationship Between the HKSAR and Taiwan (visited Jan. 17, 2000)
<http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199809/16/0916069.htm>. For a recent account of the
issue, see Amanda Chang, Deal With HK Not Crucial to Taiwan's WTO Bid, Central News
Agency, Nov. 16, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library.
114 A case in point may be China's refusal to allow Pope John Paul to visit Hong Kong. A
HKSAR government spokesman offered the following explanation on August 9, 1999:
"[c]urrently, the Vatican is maintaining "diplomatic relations" with Taiwan. As such, the
proposed visit to Hong Kong by the Pope involves foreign affairs. It would only be
appropriate to discuss the proposed visit, after the Central People's Government and the
Vatican have resolved the relevant issues." See Statement on Visit by the Pope (visited Jan.
17, 2000) <http:llwww.info.gov.hk/gia/generall199908/09/0809224.htm>. However, when
the 1997 World Bank Group/International Monetary Fund Annual Meetings were held in
Hong Kong, officials from 25 states maintaining "diplomatic relations" with Taiwan at that
time were allowed to attend the meetings. See LCQ6: CPG Responsiblefor ForeignAffairs
Relating
to
the
HKSAR
(visited
Jan.
17,
2000)
<http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199910/13/1013139.htm>.
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and peaceful international environment for China's own economic
development and modernization, n 5 it seems likely that Chinese interference
will be rare except on the issue of Taiwan and that, arguably, the HKSAR
will still be able to take an independent line on other issues where the
interests of Hong Kong and the PRC diverge, since one of the express aims
of the Basic Law is to protect such differences between China and the
HKSAR and16 since there are really few other areas as delicate as the question
of Taiwan.1
In principle, the HKSAR also has to follow China's decisions on
international sanctions. On July 18, 1997, the HKSAR Provisional LegCo
adopted U.N. Sanctions Bill 1997,117 which provides that the Chief
Executive shall "make regulations to give effect to" relevant instructions
from the "instructing authority," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People's Republic of China,
[w]here, under Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, the
Security Council of the United Nations has decided on a measure to be
employed to give effect to any of its decisions and has called on the
People's Republic of China to apply the measure, then any instruction
given by the instructing authority to the Chief Executive
(a) to implement the sanctions specified in the instruction against the
place outside the People's Republic of China specified in the instruction
for the purposes of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China applying that measure .... 118
According to this legislation, the HKSAR government has published
regulations to give effect to the CPG's instructions on implementation of the
U.N. sanctions against, for example, Iraq, Libya, Angola, Somalia, Liberia,
and Rwanda. " 9

115

In a speech addressing China's envoys at a national meeting on diplomatic work in

Beijing on August 28, 1998, PRC President Jiang Zemin said that China will strive to
create a better international environment favorable to the realization of its goals in the

socialist modernization drive. He added that: China's reform, opening-up and
modernization drive needs domestic political stability and unity, as well as a peaceful
international environment. Jiang on Chinese Diplomacy, 41 BEIJING REv., Sept. 21-27,
1998, at 4.
116 The at times frosty relationship between the United States and the PRC is perhaps
another such delicate area.
117 A list of bills passed by the Provisional Legislative Council is available at
17,
2000)
Jan.
Bills
(visited
Council
Legislative
Provisional
<http'//www.legco.gov.hkyr97-98/english/bills/byr9798.htm>.
Nations Sanctions Ordinance (July 18, 1997), available in
11 United
<http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr97-98/english/billsal25-e.htm> (visited Feb. 12, 2000).
119 See Six Regulations Implementing U.N. Sanctions Gazetted, CHINA PRESS [QIAo

BAo], Aug. 23, 1997, at A7.
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At least in theory, the HKSAR should also join in China's own
sanctions against another state in a "tit-for-tat," retaliatory trade war or
other dispute. In the past, Hong Kong joined in the UK's unilateral sanctions
against Argentina during the war over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.
However, the UK allowed Hong Kong to decide for itself whether to join
sanctions imposed by the British Commonwealth countries against South
Africa for its apartheid regime. Arguably, at least to be consistent with the
Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas precedent and hard-line PRC policy and
practice on the Taiwan issue, the HKSAR should join China's sanctions,
especially on issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity. 120 However, this
is a question upon which there can only be speculation now, for future
determinations will have to be made under the control of the PRC Central
Authorities and, in any event, likely occasions for actual use of such
sanctions would appear to be exceedingly rare.
As the HKSAR's external powers, albeit highly autonomous and
unprecedented, are granted powers, while the foreign affairs powers of the
PRC come directly from its sovereignty, the former therefore has to bear the
"brand" of the latter. For example, when the HKSAR participates in
international organizations - governmental and non-governmental - in its
own right, it must be represented as "Hong Kong, China."' 2 1 When
representatives of the HKSAR participate in international organizations or
conferences as members of the delegations of the PRC, they may express
their own views but must use the name of "Hong Kong, China."'22- The
HKSAR's own shipping register also uses the term "Hong Kong, China" in
its name. 23 To China, this is certainly not just a game of names; the seeming
formality actually carries important political and legal significance,
especially in light of the Taiwan issue.
Finally, there is also a physical time limit and an express condition to
the current external autonomy of the HKSAR. Basic Law Article 5 states:
"The socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way
of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years."' 24 China's guarantee of the
120 After NATO's bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade on May 7,1999, Beijing

banned a number of previously scheduled visits to Hong Kong by warships of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet in May and June. Although the ban affected Hong Kong's economy - since,
each year, up to 70 U.S. Navy ships visit Hong Kong, spending some U.S. $50 million the issue is distinguishable because permission to grant visits by foreign warships rests
with the sole discretion of the PRC Central Authorities as a matter of defense. See Beijing
Bans Visits by U.S. Navy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 21, 1999, at 4; Stella Lee,
PentagonRegrets Ban on U.S. Navy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 22, 1999.
121 Basic Law, supra note 7, at arts. 149 & 151.
'22Id. art.

152.

'2'Id. art. 125.
124 Id. art. 5.

2000]

THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 31

HKSAR's autonomy, including its external autonomy, is not open-ended
and, in the final analysis, only for fifty years. What will happen after fifty
years? Although Deng Xiaoping said that China's policy toward Hong Kong
would not change for 100 years,'2 the question will be completely up to the
future PRC leadership to answer. In addition, many powers now granted to
the HKSAR are based on the differences between mainland China and Hong
Kong. As Hong Kong is in a process of reintegration into China, what will
happen when some of the differences between China and Hong Kong
diminish as China continues to catch up or, as others have rather
pessimistically warned, 126 the HKSAR continues to be integrated into and
becomes more like the PRC? Again, it is China that holds the answer.
Ill. THE INTERNATIONAL CoMMUNITY AND THE HKSAR's EXTERNAL
AUTONOMY

The HKSAR's external autonomy also depends on the recognition and
support of the international community. Practically speaking, Hong Kong's
autonomous external powers could become meaningless if few states and
international organizations were interested in developing and maintaining
separate relations with it. From the point of view of international law, unlike
states and international organizations, which are regarded as the normal
types of international legal persons and can acquire their international
personalities by meeting fixed conditions, 127 Hong Kong's international legal
status relies not only on China's authorization but also on the recognition
and acceptance of other, existing international persons.
125 On June 3, 1988, Deng Xiaoping told all the participants at the "International
Conference on China and the World in the Nineties" that:

We have solemnly promised that our policy towards Hong Kong will remain unchanged
for fifty years after 1997. Why 50 years? There is a reason for that. We need not only to
reassure the people of Hong Kong but also to take into consideration the close relation
between the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and the strategy for the development
of China. The time needed for development includes the last 12 years of this century and
the first 50 years of the next. So, how can we change our policy during those 50 years?
Now there is only one Hong Kong, but we plan to build several more Hong Kongs in the
interior. In other words, to achieve the strategic objective of development, we need to
open wider to the outside world. Such being the case, how can we change our policy
towards Hong Kong? As a matter of fact, 50 years is only a vivid way of putting it. Even
after 50 years our policy will not change either. That is, for the first 50 years it cannot be
changed, and for the second there will be no need to change it. So this is not just idle
talk.
DENG XIAOPING, supranote 1, at 61.
126 See, e.g., DAvm NEWMAN & ALVIN RABUSHKA, HONG KONG UNDER CHINESE RULE:
THE FIRST YEAR, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace: Essays in Public Policy,

No. 90 (1998).
127 See BROWNLE, supra note 88, at 59.
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A.
The International Community's Role
ExternalAutonomy

in the HKSAR 's

The HKSAR's external autonomy must exist and operate in a dynamic
relationship between Hong Kong and the outside world. It goes almost
without saying that the expansive grant of treaty power to the HKSAR
would become only so much verbiage if few states or international
organizations had the need or desire to negotiate and sign bilateral
agreements with the HKSAR. Similarly, while the PRC agreed that
international treaties that were applied to Hong Kong by Britain would
continue to be applied to Hong Kong after 1997, both Britain and China had
to seek the consent of other parties to these treaties who could refuse to be
bound by these treaties involving Hong Kong on the grounds that Hong
Kong's return to China constituted a fundamental change in circumstances,
or that Hong Kong could not carry out its international obligations
independently. 128
In a broader sense, the HKSAR's external autonomy also exists and
operates in China's comprehensive relations with the rest of the world,
particularly with the HKSAR's main economic partners. Not only China's
foreign policy but also the "China" policies of other nations will affect Hong
Kong's external autonomy. For example, during the recent, continuing row
between China and the United States over allegations of Chinese spying and
illegal acquisition of American nuclear weapons technology, it has been
reported that Hong Kong's privilege to import "dual
use" American
29
technology, which is denied to China, may be removed.1
Clearly, the international community, via its power of recognition and
support, can exercise some "constitutive" effect on Hong' Kong's
autonomous status as a non-sovereign international actor, or it can deny or
cut down that recognition and support and thereby undermine Hong Kong's
external autonomy. The use of such power is starkly evident, for instance, in
the adoption by the U.S. of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of
1992.3 Under the terms of the Act, the United States on the one hand

128

See YASH GHAi, supra note 105, at 455, n. 14.

129See

Simon Beck, Spy Row Threatens SAR Imports of Technology, S. CHINA MORNING

POST, Mar. 27, 1999, at 1; Simon Beck, Export Status is on the Line, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 27, 1999, at 17.
130 See United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, 22 USC §§ 5701-5732 (1992)
(passed during the 102nd Congress and signed into law by President George Bush on Oct.
5, 1992). Since 1993, the U.S. State Department has released six Hong Kong Policy Act
Reports and the last such report is due to come out around the same time this Article will
be printed. In addition, since July 1, 1997, there have been six reports made by House Task
Force on the Hong Kong Transition as to the status of Hong Kong following its return to
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expressly recognizes and supports the autonomous status of the HKSAR
within the PRC, but on the other hand such recognition and support is
subject to the proviso that the HKSAR remains "sufficiently autonomous"
under the terms of the Joint Declaration.13 1 On the basis of the terms,
obligations, and expectations expressed in the Joint Declaration with respect
to Hong Kong, the statute authorizes the President at any time on or after
July 1, 1997 to issue a determination that Hong Kong is "not sufficiently
autonomous" and by executive order to suspend the application of any U.S.
laws that accord Hong Kong treatment different from that of the PRC.
Furthermore, as a means of active oversight, the Act requires the Secretary
of State to issue reports to Congress summarizing conditions in Hong Kong
of interest to the United States from March 31, 1993 through March 31,
2000.132

Although no other country in the world has adopted legislation similar
to the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act, about which China has expressed
resentment, 133 both Britain and the EU do issue their own periodical reports
on Hong Kong.134 These documents constitute valuable sources for
researching and evaluating, among other things, the development of Hong
Kong's external relations with the countries and regions in question. They
also reveal another unusual aspect of the HKSAR's external autonomy: that
is, behind such unprecedented autonomy lies unprecedented international
recognition. It is rare for an autonomous region to attract such strong
support and even "coercive" as arguably in the case of the U.S.-Hong Kong
Policy Act pressure from the West. There is no question that the West has
important stakes in both political and economic terms in continuing its
support of the HKSAR's autonomy, including providing for more liberal and
favorable treatment to Hong Kong in such areas as trade, finance,
immigration, and law enforcement. However, strong as the international
recognition and support is, the HKSAR's external autonomy could still
become an easy target in the future if relations should sour among Hong
Kong, the PRC, and their major Western trading partners.
the PRC. All these reports are available at <http'J/www.usconsulate.org.hk/ushk/> (visited
Feb. 9, 2000).
131 See United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §5722(a) & (b) (1992).
132 Id. §5731.
133

The U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act "provoked Beijing's wrath as 'an unwelcome

American interference in purely Chinese domestic affairs detrimental to health Sino-U.S.
relations."' Ming K. Chan, Global Implications of Hong Kong's Retrocession to Chinese
Sovereignty, in HONG KONG's REUNION WITH CHINA: THE GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 29 & 40 n.20
(Gerard A. Postiglione & James T.H. Tang, eds., 1997).
134 See, e.g., Report on the European Union and Hong Kong: Beyond 1997, COM(97)
171 final. For the series of six-month reports presented by the UK Foreign Secretary to
Britain's Parliament, see <http'//www.fco.gov.uk/news/keythemepage.asp?56> (visited
Dec. 2, 2000).
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Foreseeing that the recognition and support of the international
community would play an important role in determining the level of external
autonomy to be enjoyed by the HKSAR, both the PRC and UK actively and
successfully sought out such recognition and support on behalf of Hong
Kong in regard to Hong Kong's international rights and obligations during
the transition period after the signing of the Joint Declaration and leading up
to July 1997.135 In the future, China and the HKSAR will have to continue to
seek international recognition and support for various aspects of the
HKSAR's external autonomy. One of the most important tasks of the
HKSAR's Immigration Department, for example, is to promote the HKSAR
passport throughout the world, especially in the EU and in Latin American
countries. Currently, only some sixty-seven countries/territories give visafree access to HKSAR passport holders, 36 compared to the approximately
eighty countries that admit holders of the UK's special
37 Hong Kong British
National (Overseas) (BN(O)) passport without visas.1
B.

Hong Kong's InternationalLegal Personality

An international person can be briefly defined in international law as an
entity capable of possessing international rights and duties and having the
capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims. 138 According
to this definition, not only states and international organizations have been
generally regarded as the normal types of international legal persons, but
also a variety of other historical and current entities have been recognized as
international persons to varying extents. The test is that, as long as an
entity's international capacity has been accepted and significant international
legal relations between the entity and existing international legal persons
135

For example, as of June 30, 1997, China and the UK had secured that 214

international treaties would continue to apply to Hong Kong. For a list of these treaties, see
The Position of the People's Republic of China and the United Kingdom on Multilateral
Treaties Applying to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 36 L L. M.
1675,1675-83 (1997). It was also determined that the HKSAR would continue to
participate in 34 international organizations after July 1, 1997. See China Notifies U.N. on
Treaties Applying to HK, CHINA DAILY, Jun. 23, 1997, at 1; Ministry of Foreign Affairs'
Spokesman on HKSAR's Continuing Participation in Activities of International
Organizations,PEOPLE' DAILY (Overseas Edition) [Renmin Ribao (Haiwaiban)], (Jun. 25,
1997), at 4.
136 See Government Welcomes Visa-Free Arrangements (visited Jan. 19, 2000)
<http'//www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199911/11/ 1111110.htm>. One million HKSAR
passports have been issued so far. See Lee King-wai, Tampered PassportsLeads to Rules
Clamp, HONG KONG STANDARD, Dec. 28, 1999, availablein LEXIS, News Library.
137 See Jane C.Y. Lee, Nationality and Right of Abode, in THE OTHER HONG KONG
REPORT: 1997, at 253, 255 (Joseph Y.S. Cheng ed., 1997).
138 See Reparationfor Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, I.C.J. 174,
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maintained, such an entity may be recognized as a person under international
law to the extent that its personality exists only in the relations between the
entity and those international legal persons who recognize the entity's
personality. In other words, the key element to establish a new international
person is the existence of international legal relations, which are the result of
a particular entity's international legal capacities, as recognized and
accepted by existing international persons.
Such being the case, the HKSAR can be quite readily identified as an
international legal person. Under British colonial rule, Hong Kong had
developed considerable external autonomy in its economic relations with
other parts of the world. In general, however, the existence of such external
autonomy in its recent colonial history, especially before the transition period
(May 27, 1985 through June 30, 1997), was arguably insufficient to support
a separate international legal personality for Hong Kong, even though the
substantial development of autonomous features in implementing the Joint
Declaration during the transition period, such as the signing of several
bilateral treaties with foreign states, might have been. Since the handover,
the continuation of Hong Kong's pre-handover international rights and
obligations, the practice of the HKSAR's expanded and unprecedented
external autonomy in accordance with the Basic Law, and the solemn
guarantee of such autonomy under the Joint Declaration (an international
treaty), as well as general recognition and tremendous support throughout
the world, all point to the establishment of a limited international legal
personality for the HKSAR as a non-state entity. Today, among the
HKSAR's key international legal relations are a number of separate
memberships in international organizations which do not require statehood as
the condition for membership and a net of bilateral treaties and agreements
between Hong Kong on the39 one hand and foreign nations and international
organizations on the other. 1
Nevertheless, while the HKSAR's international legal status may be
strong with unprecedented external autonomy as an autonomous region, its
international personality is necessarily limited. Despite the fact that states,
international organizations, and entities like the HKSAR are all deemed
international persons, the extent of their personality varies significantly. It is
perhaps in this sense that Roda Mushkat feels that defining Hong Kong's
international legal status poses "a daunting challenge to an international
lawyer confronted with an entity which is not a 'state', yet possessing
'stately attributes'; not 'sovereign' yet 'highly autonomous'; not a
139An example of an HKSAR bilateral treaty with an international organization is the

Customs Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the HKSAR of
May 13, 1999. See HKSARG Signs Customs Co-operation Agreement with European
2000)
3,
(visited
Jan.
Community
<http'J/www.info.gov.hklgia/generall199905/13/0513114.
htm>.
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'conventional' member of the international
1 0 community, yet a most
respectable 'actor' on the international stage."
Compared with those of the principal international persons (states)
Hong Kong's international legal relations are largely limited to non-political
and non-military areas, as the Basic Law clearly provides that China is
responsible for the HKSAR's foreign affairs and defense.141 Thus, only to
the extent that the HKSAR is allowed to have autonomous legal relations
with foreign states and international organizations are Hong Kong and China
two separate legal persons. Beyond the HKSAR's external autonomy, there
is only one legal person representing China namely, the PRC and the
HKSAR on the international plane, and to still argue for some separate legal
personality for the HKSAR, as Mushkat has, distorts the real picture of the
HKSAR's international legal personality.
For example, although analytically attractive, it is legally specious to
claim - as Mushkat does - that the HKSAR's international personality can
be based on its "stately attributes," including its own population, territory,
government, and ability to engage in international action autonomously. 42
Such ambiguous maneuvering along the line between national sovereignty
and regional autonomy marks an attempt to transgress the boundary between
China's sovereignty and the HKSAR's autonomy. It therefore does not help
to either justify or define the HKSAR's international personality. On the
contrary, it only leads to more misleading analogies with respect to Hong
Kong.
One such problematic analogy to Liechtenstein's membership in the
Statute of the ICJ is that, since the HKSAR has the capacity to bear
international responsibility, then it should be able to become a party to the
ICJ statute and bring international claims before the ICJ.14 3 Yet, by whatever

international law standard, and in spite of any factual arguments about size
of population, territorial area, etc., Liechtenstein is a sovereign state and the
HKSAR is not. Until the ICJ statute is modified, only states may be parties
to that statute, as well as "in cases before the Court."1 "
supra note 93, at 1.
141 See Basic Law, supra note 7, at art. 2; see also Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at
3(2).
142 MUSHKAT, supra, note 93 at 4-11.
140 MUSHKAT,

'43

See id. at 38.

Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34, 59 Stat. 1055,
1059. Article 34(1) of the ICJ Statute states that (1) Only states may be parties in cases
before the Court. Id. Articles 35(1) and 35(2) state:
(1) The Court shall be open to the states parties to the present Statute. (2) The
conditions under which the Court shall be open to other states shall, subject to the
144

special provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by the Security Council,

but in no case shall such conditions place the parties in position of inequality before the
Court.
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Another questionable analogy is that, since "neither the British

Nationality (Overseas) [BN(O)] nor the Chinese nationality to be conferred
on the inhabitants of the HKSAR could be regarded as providing real and
145
effective nationality," then, according to the criterion of the "genuine link,"'
the HKSAR government should be able to provide diplomatic or equivalent
protection to its people traveling overseas or inChina. 146 However, leaving
aside the questionable premise that neither the BN(O) 147 nor the Chinese

nationality for HKSAR residents confer any real and effective nationality,
and bearing in mind that it is a general rule of international law that
nationality is a prerequisite for diplomatic protection, l14 it is clear that the
criterion of the genuine link simply cannot be used to argue that an
autonomous region (the HKSAR) is competent to challenge or bypass its
sovereign (the PRC) and provide its own "diplomatic" protection to the
Chinese nationals residing in Hong Kong - an inalienable part of the PRC as
proclaimed in the Joint Declaration, consistent with the fact of the July 1997
handover, and pursuant to the Basic Law.
The boundary between the PRC's sovereignty and the HKSAR's
autonomy also raises questions with respect to the assertion that Hong Kong
Id. art. 35.
145Nationality is usually acquired on the basis of jus soli (the law of the soil or land) or
jus sanguinis (the law of blood or descent). However, according to the "genuine link"
criterion, jus soli or jus sanguinis links between a state and an individual may not be
genuine and the real legal bond between a person's nationality and a state may instead be
based on the social fact of attachment, such as one's residence and main business location.
The criterion of the genuine link is useful in cases of dual nationality; however, its
application in Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.) 1955, I.C.J. 25-26 (Apr. 6), which Mushkat
cites, is controversial. See MUSHKAT, supra note 93, at 40. The ICJ there denied
Liechtenstein the right to protect Friedrich Nottebohm - a German national naturalized in
Liechtenstein but living in Guatemala for a long time - against Guatemala, since the Court
found any genuine link between Liechtenstein and Nottebohm to be lacking. See
Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.) 1955, LC.J. 25-26 (Apr. 6).
146See MuSHKAT, supranote 93, at 40.
147A passport status adopted by Britain in the British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act of
1990 to maintain a "formal" relationship with Britain and to include the privilege of
continued reliance on British consular protection - although bestowing no right of abode in
the UK. See British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act, 1990, ch. 34 (Eng.). Over three million

Hong Kongers are registered as BN(O)s. See Six-Monthly Report on the Implementation of
17,
2000)
(visited
Jan.
Hong
Kong
Declaration on
the
Joint

<http:www.fco.gov.uk/news/keythemepage.asp?56> at Jan.-June 1997, para. 14.6.
148 The only exception to this rule is that an international organization such as the U.N.
may provide diplomatic protection to its agents. In its 1949 advisory opinion on the
reparation for injuries suffered in service of the U.N., the ICJ unanimously held that the
U.N. has the legal capacity to claim its own damages for injuries suffered by individuals as
its agents. However, to date, there has never been a case in which the U.N. competed
against the claim of its agent's own home state.
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should be given legal personality by the international community in a manner
similar to the way international personality is accorded to "the Order of
Malta (for its dedication to the assistance of the world's sick and poor), the
Holy See (for leading the Catholic Church)," and "national liberation
movements (for their purported aim to combat colonialism)." 149 Such an
assertion overlooks the basic fact that neither the Order of Malta nor the
Holy See is subject to a modem, sovereign state. Hong Kong's international
personality is not only different from that of states, but also different from
that of entities like the Holy See, the Order of Malta, or, for that matter, the
Palestinian Liberation Organization. Although the international legal
personalities of such entities all depend on the recognition and acceptance of
the international community, in the final analysis only Hong Kong needed,
and will again need after fifty years of guaranteed existence, a sovereign's,
i.e. China's, authorization for its international capacities.
IV. CONCLUSION
Upon reflection, it seems clear that the HKSAR's external autonomy is
unique in its unprecedentedness, its special Chinese dimension, and the
strong international recognition and support it has received. As a model, the
HKSAR's external autonomy is not, and cannot be, perfect, for it is an
ongoing, transitional system that will continue to require time and experience
to fill in the details, clarify the ambiguities, and improve upon its original
design. However, it has arguably established a higher standard and
expectation of autonomy in the world, overcoming tremendous obstacles,
especially some deep-seated East-West political conflicts. Although it is only
intended to exist for fifty years, the Hong Kong model could become a
lasting example of foreign affairs power-sharing for the world community.
As the theoretical and legal blueprints of the model have passed their initial
tests and survived some difficult challenges, and as all major players (Hong
Kong itself, the PRC, and the international community) involved have
obvious interests in maintaining and supporting the HKSAR's external
autonomy, the continued success of that autonomy in practice can be
expected and may eventually guarantee its utility as a model of some kind,
some time, elsewhere in on the globe, from which disputed territories can
take helpful guidance.
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MUSHKAT, supra note 93, at 10.

